When analysing the application of Article 101 by the CJEU, it should be noted that the Court of Justice of the EU operates in a different institutional framework from that of the Us Supreme Court. As stated in the « Origins and Interpretation of the `Concerted Practice` » section of this website, the three countries that contributed significantly to the drafting of the Treaties of Rome (today`s first version of the TFEU) were France, Germany and the Netherlands – all civil law countries. This civil legacy could indicate that there is little room for judicial elaboration of rules by succession that are not covered by the text of the Treaty in the case law of the CJEU on competition. Consequently, the ECJ`s interpretation of Article 101 tends to be static, since the General Court acts according to the fixed objectives enshrined in the provisions of the TFEU. Although previous cases are cited as the rule of law in the CJEU`s opinions, the Court tends to rely increasingly on long-standing interpretations of the treaty (as illustrated by modern cases that often use the same (or almost) same language as cases from the early 1960s without citation). In contrast, the Supreme Court`s interpretation of the Sherman Act is more cyclical because it does not apply to such a fixed purpose. The Supreme Court`s broader range of interpretive powers allows it to react and adapt to market trends and economic theories, resulting in legal rules that change over time (as noted above). If you want to learn more about the contours of the reason rule test, you can read section 3.3. of the United States Dep`t of Justice and Federal Trade Comm`n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Between Competitors of April 2000, which contains certain analytical criteria for the application of the rational rule test to agreements between actual and potential competitors. The Supreme Court of India has in Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India12 and TELCO v. Registrar of RT13 that the rule of reason in this case should be functional because the term « Restricted Business Practices » is very broad and non-inclusive in nature. In addition, in Sodhi Transport Co.c.
State of the U.S. P14, it was stated that the phrase « should be presumed » was considered an assumption and not as evidence itself, but only as a characteristic of who has the burden of proof. Vertical agreements relating to exercises in relation to § 3 para. 4 of the Competition Act, must then be dissected after reviewing the « rule of reason » under the Competition Act . . .